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NUCLEAR WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
AND THE SCOPE OF PROTECTED ACTIVITY
UNDER SECTION 210 OF THE ENERGY
REORGANIZATION ACT
BY

STEPHEN

M.

KOHN*

AND
THOMAS CARPENTER**

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1978 Congress amended the Energy Reorganization Act in order
to protect whistleblowers-employees who disclose potential violations
of nuclear health and safety laws-from retaliation by their employers. 1
Since passage of the nuclear whistleblower protection amendment, the
circuit courts of appeals are divided over the issue of what constitutes
protected activity.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in 1984 that an
employee must contact a "competent organ of government" to be protected. 2 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
have disagreed, and have held that employees who disclose potential
health and safety violations directly to their supervisors are protected
against discrimination, even if there has been no direct notification to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).3 The Supreme Court, with
three Justices dissenting, has recently denied certiorari of the utilities'
4
appeal of the Tenth Circuit decision.
In this Article we shall examine the public policy, legal, and regulatory issues raised as a result of this split on the issue of the scope of
protection in the circuit courts of appeals. These issues go to the heart of
the viability of nuclear whistleblower protection. At stake is the NRC's
* J.D. 1984, Northeastern University, M.A. 1981, Brown University, B.S. 1979, Boston University. Mr. Kohn is the Clinical Director of the Government Accountability Project and author of
PROTECTING ENVIRONMENTAL AND NUCLEAR WHISTLEBLOWERs:

A LITIGATION MANUAL

(Washington, D.C., Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 1985).
** J.D. 1986, Antioch School of Law. Mr. Carpenter is the Citizens Clinic Director of the Government Accountability Project.
Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5851, is reprinted in the appendix.
2 Brown and Root, Inc. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029, 1036 (5th Cir. 1984).
3 Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Systems, 735 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1984); Kansas Gas &
Electric Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985).
4 Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied - U.S (1986) (O'Conner, White & Stevens dissenting).

ANTIOCH LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:73

ability to regulate dangerous nuclear technology, and the public's right to
know information concerning potential violations of nuclear safety laws.
This Article will examine in Part 11 the congressional policies behind the whistleblower protection statutes; in Part III the scope of protected activity as seen by the Fifth Circuit's Brown & Root decision and
the resultant controversy; in Part IV internal whistleblowing and the relationship between Atomic Energy Regulation; and, in Part V why the
Brown & Root court was wrong in failing to extend the nuclear
whistleblower protections to employees who dissent internally, without
resorting to contact with the government.
II. CONGRESSIONAL POLICIES BEHIND
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION

"Whistleblowing" has been defined as the act of disclosing any information that an employee reasonably believes evidences a violation of
any law, rule or regulation, mismanagement, corruption, abuse of authority, or threat to public health and safety at the worksite. 5 Even
though whistleblowers are often unpopular with their supervisors, 6 Congress has recognized their value. 7 Whistleblowers have saved the American public billions of dollars" and disclosed information that has
prevented human injuries and saved lives. 9
To protect employees who expose potential corruption, illegality,
and health and safety violations, Congress has passed scores of
5 C. PETERS AND

T.

BRANCH, BLOWING THE WHISTLE (1972).

6 In Senate Report No. 95-969, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2723, Congress
noted the harsh discrimination that whistleblowers often face:
Often, the whistleblower's reward for dedication to the highest moral principles is harassment and abuse. Whistleblowers frequently encounter severe damage to their careers and substantial economic loss.
7 See Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., The Whistleblowers: A
Report on Federal Employees Who Disclose Acts of Government Waste, Abuse, and Corruption,
(Comm. Print 1978), p. iii: "The efforts of whistleblowers ultimately redound to the benefit of the
administrative agencies and the public. Unfortunately, the reward for a whistleblower's adherence
to the highest moral principles is often harassment by the employee's supervisors."
8 A September 25, 1984 GAO report entitled 5-Year Summary of Results of GAO Fraud Hotline, GAO/AFMD-84-70, revealed that "hotline referrals" from January 18, 1979 to January 17,
1984 resulted in 10,600 referrals to agency inspectors general with an estimated identification of
about $20 million in misspent federal funds.
9 See, R. NADER, WHISTLEBLOWING (1972), which tells the story of, among others, Ernest

Fitzgerald (who exposed $2 billion in cost overruns in the military), Dr. John Gofman and Dr.
Arthur Tamplin (exposed radiation health hazards while with the Atomic Energy Commission),
William Stieglitz (automobile safety) and more. Also see, A. WESTIN, WHISTLEBLOWING: LoyALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION (1981). For further reading, see the Senate Comm. on

Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., op. cit., which provided the basis and momentum for
passage of the Civil Service Reform Act whistleblowing provisions.
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whistleblower protection laws.' 0 The nuclear whistleblower protection
law, section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5851, was
passed in 1978 as one of a series of environmental whistleblower protection laws" designed to help the enforcement of environmental laws, 12 to
enhance environmental quality, and to protect public health and safety. 13
According to its legislative history, section 210 was modeled after
the environmental whistleblower protection clauses of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) and the Clean Air Act (CAA). 14 These
10 See, for example:
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3)
Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 2305(a) and 2305(b)
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1140
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. 660(c)(1)
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(4)
Foreign Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. 4133(a) (1981)
Farm Labor Act, 29 U.S.C. 1855(a)
Job Training Partnership Act, 29 U.S.C. 1574(g)
Federal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. 815(c) (1977)
Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 948(a) (1984)
"Jury System Improvements Act of 1978", 28 U.S.C. 1875(a)
Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. 2301-02
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000(a)(2), 2000(e)(17)
Age Discrimination Act, 29 U.S.C. 621-634
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d)
Railroad Safety Act, 25 U.S.C. 441
Common Carrier Safety, 45 U.S.C. 60
Safe Container Act, 46 U.S.C. 1506(a)
II Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), 42 U.S.C. 5851; Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7622;
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. 300j-9; Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), 42 U.S.C.
6971; Water Pollution Control Act (WPCA), 33 U.S.C. 1367; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9610; Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA), 15 U.S.C. 2622; Federal Surface Mining Act (FSMA), 30 U.S.C. 1293.
12 For the specific congressional history of these nuclear and environmental whistleblower
amendments, see ERA, 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 7303; SDWA, 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News, 6454; CAA, 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 1077; SWDA, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News, 6238; WPCA, 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 3668; CERCLA, 1980 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News, 6119; TSCA, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 4491; FSMA, 1977 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News, 593.
13 Royce v. Bechtel Power Corp., 83-ERA-3, slip op. of AL, at 2 (November 29, 1983); for the
Congressional purposes behind the various environmental laws, see Energy Reorganization Act
(ERA), 42 U.S.C. 5801; TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 2601; CAA, 42 U.S.C. 7401(a), 42 U.S.C. 7470; FWPCA,
33 U.S.C. 125; RCRA (Solid Waste Disposal Act), 42 U.S.C. 6901, 6902.
14 The legislative history of section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act reads:
This amendment is substantially identical to provisions in the Clean Air Act and the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The legislative history of those acts indicated
that such provisions were patterned after the National Labor Management Act and a
similar provision in Public Law 91-173 relating to the health and safety of the Nation's
coal miners.
1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 7303.
Four other environmental whistleblower laws were also modeled after the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. These are the Toxic Substances Control Act, Superfund, Safe Drinking Water
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whistleblower laws established a uniform administrative remedy within
the Department of Labor for employees (both government and private
sector) who allege they are discriminated against for reporting potential
violations of nuclear safety laws or regulations. If discrimination is
found, the Secretary of Labor is required to order, among other remedies,
that the employee be reinstated with back pay, and that attorneys fees
and costs, as well as compensatory damages, where appropriate, be
awarded. Either party may appeal the Secretary of Labor's order to the
5
appropriate U.S. Court of Appeals.'
The legislative history of the FWPCA and CAA reveals Congress'
intent to aggressively protect environmental whistleblowers. Congress
was looking to workers to help enforce the nation's environmental laws:
The best source of information about what a company is actually
doing or not doing is often its own employees, and this amendment would ensure that an employee could provide such information without losing his job or otherwise suffering economically
from retribution from the polluter.16
In addition to protecting employees' jobs, Congress wanted to stop
corporations from using the threat of economic retaliation to silence the
disclosure of environmental concerns. Representative William D. Ford
(D. Mich.), in offering an amendment to the FWPCA employee protection provision which was pending before the House, declared:
Mr. Chairman, in offering this amendment we are only seeking to
protect workers and communities from those very few in industry
who refuse to face up to the fact that they are polluting our waterways, and who hope that by pressuring their employees and frightening communities with economic threats, they will gain relief
from the requirement of any effluent limitation or abatement
7

order. 1

The broad nature of these amendments is highlighted by the legislative history of the Clean Air Act's employee protection provisions. This
indicates that Congress intended all employees to be covered, whether
they were in the private sector, or employed by the federal or state governments. Likewise, even if the allegations raised by a worker were ultiAct, and Solid Waste Disposal Act. Both the Toxic Substances Control Act and the Safe Drinking
Water Act also provide for exemplary damages. See, 29 C.F.R. part 24 and STEPHEN M. KOHN,
PROTECTING

ENVIRONMENTAL AND NUCLEAR

WHISTLEBLOWERS:

A

LITIGATION MANUAL

(GAP/NIRS, Washington, D.C. 1985).
'5
Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. section 210(B)(1)(c)(1).
16 Legislative history of FWPCA cited in Conference Report of Clean Air Act, 1977 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News, 1077, 1404.
17 118 Cong. Rec. 10,766-10,768 (1972) reprinted in Legislative History of the Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, at 655.
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mately disproved, the worker would still be protected. The Conference
Committee Report stated that employees would be protected from
retaliation
due to an employee's participation in, or assistance to, the administration, implementation, or enforcement of the Clean Air Act or
any requirements promulgated pursuant to it. These requirements
would include any state or local requirements which are incorporated in the applicable implementation plan... Retaliatory action
by the employer would also be prohibited if it were in response to
an employee's exercise of rights under Federal, State, or local
Clean Air Act legislation or regulations. This would be the case
even if the employee's action was not directed against the employer (e.g., the filing of a citizen suit against the Administrator or
against another company). Moreover, as in the Safe Drinking
Water Act and the Federal Water Pollution Act, the employer
would not have to be proven to be in violation of a Clean Air Act
requirement in order for this section to protect the employee's
action.' 8
As with the Clean Air Act, Congress intended that section 210 serve
the "broad, remedial purpose of protecting workers from retaliation
based on their concern for safety and quality."' 19
III.

THE SCOPE OF PROTECTED ACTIVITY AND THE "BROWN &
ROOT" CONTROVERSY

The controversy over the scope of protected activity focuses on the
interpretation of section 210(a) of the ERA, 42 U.S.C. 5851 (a). Section
210(a) defines protected activity as when an employee:
(1) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to
commence or cause to be commenced a proceeding under this Act
or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or a proceeding
1s1977

U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 1404-1405.
19Mackowiak v. University, 735 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1984); Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v.
Brock, 780 F.2d 1505, 1512 (10th Cir. 1985). The Senate report on section 210 states:
Under this section, employees and union officials could help assure that employers do
not violate requirements of the Atomic Energy Act.
Any worker who is called upon to testify or who gives information with respect to an
alleged violation of the Atomic Energy Act or a related law by his employer or who
files or institutes any proceeding to enforce such law against an employer may be subject to discrimination. This section would prohibit any firing or discrimination and
would provide an administrative procedure under which the employee or his representative could seek redress for any violation of this prohibition.
S.Rep. No. 848, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 29, 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 7303, 7304.
Also see, Deford v. Secretary of abor, 700 F.2d 281, 286 (6th Cir. 1983).
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for the administration or enforcement of any requirement imposed
under this Act or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended;
(2) testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or;
(3) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in any manner in such a proceeding or in any other manner in
such a proceeding or in any other action to carry out the purposes
20
of this Act or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
Although the statute does not explicitly state that internal
whistleblowing, i.e. to management, is protected, the Secretary of Labor
has interpreted the phrase "assisted or participated ... in any other action to carry out the purpose of this Act . . .,,21 (emphasis added), as
covering internal complaints to management. 22 The Secretary of Labor's
interpretation has been followed by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Second, 2 Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and the Supreme Court of the State of

Illinois .

1

Only the Fifth Circuit has rejected this reading of the phrase "any
other action," narrowly construing it to encompass only formal legal action. 24 Breaking with judicial precedent under section 210 and other
whistleblower protection laws, the Fifth Circuit held in Brown and Root
v. Donovan 25 that issuing a complaint to management was not formal
legal action. The Brown and Root court went on to hold internal
whistleblowing was not protected, and that in order to be protected from
discrimination under Section 210 an employee must have "contact or in'26
volvement with a competent organ of government.
The Fifth Circuit seriously erred in overturning the ruling of the
Secretary of Labor. Since issuing the Brown and Root decision, the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning has been vigorously attacked by the NRC. 27 No
other U.S. Circuit Court has adopted its reasoning. 28 Additionally, the
Secretary of Labor has refused to follow the decision in any jurisdiction
29
outside of the Fifth Circuit.
42 U.S.C. 5851(a).
Id. at (a)(3).
22 Wells v. Kansas Gas & Electric Co., 83-ERA-12 (June 14, 1984) affm. Kansas Gas & Electric
Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985).
23 Consolidated Edison v. Donovan, 673 F.2d 61 (2nd Cir. 1982); Mackowiak v. University
Nuclear Systems, 735 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1984); Kansas Gas & Electric v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505
(10th Cir. 1985); Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Il1. 2d 502, 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985).
24 747 F.2d 1029, 1032 (5th Cir. 1984).
25 Id. at 1032.
26 Id. at 1036.
27 See, e.g., Brief of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as Amicus Curiae, Kansas Gas
and Electric Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985).
28 Kansas Gas & Electric v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985); Wheeler v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985).
29 Decision of Secretary of Labor, Lockert v. Pullman Power, 84-ERA-15 (August 19, 1985).
20
21
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The legal criticisms of the Brown and Root holding have focused on
three areas: The use of the ejusdem generis rule of statutory construction; the relationship between Section 210 and judicial precedents under
other whistleblower protection laws, most notably the Mine Health and
Safety Act; and the requirement that an employee contact the government, as opposed to other potential representatives. This Article will
demonstrate that these legal criticisms are valid.
A. The "Ejusdem Generis" Rule and Statutory Construction of
Section 210
Prior to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Brown and Root, the U.S.
Courts of Appeal uniformly followed the Secretary of Labor's broad construction of the word "action," in holding that employees who "blow the
whistle" regarding a potential violation of nuclear safety laws or regula30
tions engaged in protected activity.
The Brown and Root court broke with this precedent, relying in part
upon the ejusdem generis rule of statutory interpretations. 3' The Fifth
Circuit reasoned that because the word "action" was used narrowly in
the Energy Reorganization Act to mean only legal action, the word as it
appears in 42 U.S.C. 5851(a)(3) should be likewise interpreted. 32 Thus
30 Consolidated Edison of NY v. Donovan, 673 F.2d 61 (2nd Cir. 1982); Mackowiak v. University Nuclear System, Inc., 735 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1984).
31 In Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 588 (1980), the Supreme Court explained
the rule of ejusdem generis as follows:
Under the rule of ejusdem generis, where general words follow and enumeration of
specific items, the general words are read as applying only to other items akin to those
specifically enumerated.
32 The Brown and Root decision rejected the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the phrase
"any other action" by reasoning:
Because the general term "in any other action" follows a reference to specific types
of proceedings, it is most reasonable to presume that the term "actions" refers to something similar to the specific proceedings mentioned earlier in the sentence. Only exceptionally does a writer use a general term after a list of specifics to mean something
wholly unrestrained by the specifics. Although this is merely a common-sense rule for
interpreting a sentence, in cases of statutory construction we know the rule as "ejusdem
generis." 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Section 47.17 at
103-04 (3d Ed. 1973) (1983 Supp.)
The Secretary has urged the word "actions" be construed as any conduct or act,
but such a meaning seems unlikely. First, the Secretary's construction runs against the
common-sense rule discussed above. Moreover, the statute protects participation "in
any other action," which implies an "action" is a kind of structured proceeding in
which a person may participate, not just any act a person may perform. The Secretary
argues that the proceedings expressly listed exhaust the class of all things similar to
these proceedings and therefore maintains that "actions" must be given a meaning beyond this class of similarity. We do not agree that the listed specifics exhaust the class.
For example, although we do not decide a matter not before us, it appears that a congressional investigatory proceeding or other official investigations are quite likely "ac-
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"action" would only mean formal legal action, not other types of activities. But the Fifth Circuit actually misread the ERA and consequently
misapplied the ejusdem generis doctrine.
The Fifth Circuit construed "action" in the narrow legalistic sense
because it is "not used elsewhere in the Energy Reorganization Act to
mean general conduct."' 33 The court used this finding to support the
legal conclusion that "[W]e usually presume words are used consistently
through a statute," and "a statute should be interpreted in its entirety." '34
But the Fifth Circuit was flatly wrong. The word "action" is used
broadly throughout the Energy Reorganization Act and the Atomic Energy Act. For example, within 5851 itself the word "action" is broadly
used: The Secretary of Labor may order "affirmative action to abate a
violation." (Emphasis added) 42 U.S.C. 5851(b)(2)(B)(i). At 42 U.S.C.
5821(d)(2) of the Energy Reorganization Act the Commission is given
broad power to take "action," including the "use and expenditure of
funds," all necessary "executive and administrative functions," "appointment," etc. Action is also broadly used in the following sections of the
Energy Reorganization Act: 5816(a)(b)(2); 5821(b)(2)(B); 5821 (c)(2)(B).
Moreover, the Atomic Energy Act is replete with the use of "action" in a
non-legalistic sense. For example, see 42 U.S.C. 2031, "action" of the
Commission; 42 U.S.C. 2037, "action" of Commission, or failure to
"act"; 42 U.S.C. 2057(c)(1), Commission "action" is the interest of
"common defense and security"; 42 U.S.C. 2096, Commission purchasing as "action"; 42 U.S.C. 2135, Commission taking "action" in the
tions" bearing sufficient similarity to "proceedings under" the Acts or "proceedings for
the administration or enforcement" of the Acts to warrant protection under section

5851.
Second, the Secretary's interpretation would render much of the language of section 5851 redundant. If the word "actions" has his suggested meaning, then the meaning of the entire section could just as easily have been expressed without mention of any
"proceedings" at all. Such a construction seems strained. Meltzer v. Board of Public
Instruction, 548 F.2d 559 n.38 (5th Cir. 1977).
Third, a statute should be interpreted in its entirety. See Sutherland at 37. The
language of the remainder of the ERA does not support the Secretary. The word "action" is not used elsewhere in the ERA to mean general conduct. Section 5871(e) begins: "no suit, action or other proceeding.. " (emphasis added), implying an "action"
is a kind of proceeding. Section 5851(e), entitled "Commencement of Action," authorizes the Secretary to file a "civil action" and states: "In actions brought under this
subsection ...... We usually presume words are used consistently through a statute.
Id. In summary, it seems highly unlikely that an ordinary writer of English would have
used the words of section 5851 to mean what the Secretary says they mean. It is much
more likely that "action" is used to mean something similar to formal proceedings
under the Acts or for the administration or enforcement of the requirements of the
Acts.
Brown and Root v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029, 1032 (5th Cir. 1984).
33 Id. at 1032.
34 Id.
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"public interest"; 42 U.S.C. 2151, Commission "action", i.e., the Commission entering into contracts; 42 U.S.C. 2224, "action" for purchasing
all activities alproperty; 42 U.S.C. 2231, "agency action" incorporated
35
Act.
Procedure
Administrative
the
lowed under
Thus, if we use the word "action" as it is used "[c]onsistently
through the statute," it should not be interpreted narrowly. The Fifth
Circuit's misreading of the ERA and Atomic Energy Act resulted in a
misapplication of the ejusdem generis doctrine of statutory construction.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the rule of ejusdem
generis should not be applied to restrict language that is clearly expansive. For example, in Harrison v. PPGIndustries,36 the Court construed
section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 37 which provided for judicial review of specifically enumerated provisions and "any other final action" of
the Administrator. The Court held that the broader meaning of "final
action" should apply, and not be restricted to "final actions" similar to
those specifically listed before the phrase.
The Court stated:
The rule of ejusdem generis, while firmly established, is only an
instrumentality for ascertaining the correct meaning of words
when there is uncertainty. (citations omitted). With regard to section 307(b)(1), we discern no uncertainty in the meaning of the
phrase "any other final action" .

. .

. This expansive language

offers no indication whatever that Congress intended the limiting
construction.... [W]e agree with the petitioners that the phrase,
"any other final action," in the absence of legislative history to the
contrary, must be construed to mean exactly what it says, namely,
Any other final action. (Id. at 588-589).
The Fifth Circuit also misapplied other principles of the ejusdem
generis rule. According to Sutherland'sStatutory Construction, the ejusdem generis rule should not apply when a general term "appears with no
enumeration, with no other general terms, or with no specific terms suggesting a class. .

.

. In these instances the general term remains unaf-

fected by its association with the preceding words because 'the language
of the statute furnishes ...
words.' ,,38

no criterion by which to restrict its general

35 "Action" is also used in varying ways in the following sections of the Atomic Energy Act; 42
U.S.C. 2075; 2096; 2135(c)(8); 2137(d); 2138; 2151; 2165(b); 2166(h); 2166(a); 2278(b).]
36 446 U.S. 578 (1980).
37 It should be noted that section 5851 is expressly based on the employee protection provision of
the Clean Air Act which is also based on the Mine Safety Act and the National Labor Relations Act.
S. Rep. No. 95-848, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., 29 reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News,
7303.
38 SANDS 2A, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, section 47.20 (3rd ed. 1973).

ANTIOCH LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:73

In section 210 there is no enumeration of specific terms; the only
reference is to a proceeding under the Energy Reorganization Act or the
Atomic Energy Act. Moreover, one reference to a proceeding under the
Acts does not suggest a class. Therefore, the rule of ejusdem generis
should not apply.3 9
Finally, the Supreme Court has cautioned that ejusdem generis is
not meant to
[o]bscure and defeat the intent and purpose of Congress, but to
elucidate its words and effectuate its intent. In cannot be employed to render general words meaningless. g°
The holding of the Fifth Circuit rendered the word "action" as it appears
in 42 U.S.C. 5851(a)(3) completely meaningless.
The Fifth Circuit's decision also ignored the broad remedial purposes of the Energy Reorganization Act. The Energy Reorganization
Act (ERA)4 1 is public health and safety legislation and must be broadly
construed. 42 The ERA's Congressional Declaration of Policy and Purpose, 42 U.S.C. 5801(a) states:
The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare . . . re-

quire[s] effective action to develop, and increase the efficiency and
reliability of use of, all energy sources to meet the needs of present
and future generations ...

to advance the goals of restoring, pro-

tecting, and enhancing environmental quality, and to assurepublic
health and safety. [Emphasis added].
Courts have continually held that statutes which promote the "public
health and safety" or which grant "rights to laborers" must be "liberally
43
construed".
The remedial purposes of the ERA are not only reflected in the Congressional Declaration of Policy and Purpose, but are also explicated in
the legislative history of Section 210. The Fifth Circuit in Brown and
Root v. Donovan completely ignored the remedial purposes behind section 210, and violated this rule of statutory construction when they inter39 Sands, supra at section 47.20.
40 U.S. v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 682 (1950).
41 42 U.S.C. 5801 et seq.

42 DeFord v. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1981).
43 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction, section 58.04 (4th ed.).
Sutherland's Statutory Construction further states: Remedial statutes are liberally construed to suppress the evil and advance the remedy . .. What is called a liberal construction is ordinarily one which makes the statutory rule or principle apply to more
things or in more situations than would be the case under a strict construction. (C.A.

Sands, Sutherland's Statutory Construction, Vol. 3 Ch. 60 section 60-01 (3rd ed.
1974).)]
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44
preted the word "action" as narrowly as possible.

B. Judicial Precedents and the Scope of ProtectedActivity
Whistleblower protection laws are designed to ensure that certain
types of information are freely transmitted by the employee. Congress
has passed a variety of such whistleblower protection laws, including
protections for workers under the NLRA and the Federal Mine Health
and Safety Act.
The purpose of these whistleblower protection laws was summed up
by the Supreme Court in the National Labor Relations Board
whistleblower/informant intimidation case NLRB v. Scrivener.45 In
Scrivener, the Court stated that whistleblower protection laws should be
broadly construed so as "to prevent the Board's channels of information
from being dried up by employer intimidation of prospective complainants and witnesses."

46

The logic of Scrivener was applied to the issue of protecting purely
internal worker complaints in the landmark Federal Mine Health and
Safety whistleblower protection case Phillips v. Interior Board of Mine
OperationsAppeals.4 7 In Phillips, the D.C. Circuit recognized that internal complaints need protection for two extremely important reasons.
First, "relatively effective channels of communication" need to be protected. Harassment and discrimination against employees who raise internal complaints will discourage employees from raising concerns.
Employees who uncover a potential health and safety problem are likely
to call the issue to the attention of management. Phillips noted that contacting management is, for all practical purposes, the "first step" in alert48
ing the proper officials to a potential problem.
Second, employees who engage in this "first step" must be protected
against retaliation. As Phillips noted:
Miners who insist on health and safety rules being followed, even
at the cost of slowing down production, are not likely to be popu44 The Fifth Circuit also ignored case law under the 1969 Mine Health and Safety Act and the
anti-retaliation provisions of the NLRA (both of which section 210 was modeled after), which held
that these whistleblower protection provisions must be afforded "liberal construction." Phillips v.
Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Scrivener,
405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972). The 1969 Mine Health and Safety Act, even though its statutory definition
of protected activity was more restrictive than section 210's, and did not contain any mention of
protecting "any other action," was interpreted as protecting internal whistleblowers. See, e.g., Munsey v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Phillips, supra; and 30 U.S.C. 820(b)(1).
45 405 U.S. 112 (1972).
46 Id. at 122.
47 500 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
48 Id. at 781.
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lar with mine foremen or mine top management. 4 9

The animus against a whistleblower often originates when the employee first uncovers and complains about a potential violation of the
law. As the Phillips court held, if internal activity is not protected, the
' ' 50
laws cannot be "realistically" or "effectively enforced.
Under most whistleblower protection statutes, the courts have uniformly held that internal complaints are protected activity. 51 Under section 210 of the ERA, two of the three circuits that have considered the
issue of internal whistleblowing have explicitly applied the Phillips holdings and protected internal complaints. 52 But the Fifth Circuit in Brown
and Root attempted to distinguish FMHSA cases from ERA cases.
49 Id. at 778.
50 Id.
51 Fair Labor Act cases: Love v. Re/Max of America Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1984);
Marshall v. Parking Co. of America Denver, Inc., 670 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1982) (per curiam);
Brennan v. Maxey's Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 180 (8th Cir. 1975); Hodgson v. Yinger, 20 Lab.
Real. Rep. (BNA) 78 (S.D. 1971); Goldberg v. Zenger, 43 Lab. Cas. (CCH) Para. 31, 155 (Utah
1961). 1969 Federal Mine Safety Act cases: Phillips v. Board of Mine Operations appeals, 500 F.2d

772, 781-782 (D.C. Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 939 (1974); Munsey v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1202
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Baker v. Board of Mine Operations Appeals, 595 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
OSHA cases: Donovan v. Peter Zimmer America, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 642 (D.S.C. 1982). NLRA
cases: NLRB v. Retail Store Employees' Union, 570 F.2d 586 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
819 (1978). Also see, Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
52 Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Systems, Inc., 735 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1984);
Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505, 1511 (10th Cir. 1985). The Tenth Circuit in
Kansas Gas & Electric justified applying Phillips to nuclear cases, stating:
Section 5851 of the ERA was added to the Act in 1978. It was patterned after
similar provisions in other acts. The Senate report on the ERA amendment comments
that,
[t]his amendment is substantially identical to provisions in the Clean Air Act and
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The legislative history of those acts indicated that such provisions were patterned after the National Labor Management
Act and a similar provision in Public Law 91-173 (FMSA) relating to the health and
safety of the Nation's coal miners.
S. Rep. No. 848, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 29, 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
7303.
The employee protections of the NLRA and the Federal Mining Safety Act
(FMSA) have been construed often and the teachings of those cases are instructive.
The cases stand for the general proposition that internal actions taken by an employee
do come within the purview of employee protection as guaranteed by the respective
Acts. NLRB v. Scrivener,405 U.S. 117, 92 S. Ct. 798, 31 L. Ed. 2d 79 (1972); NLRB v.
Retail Employees Union, Local 876, 570 F.2d 586 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 819,
99 S. Ct. 81, 58 L. Ed. 2d 109 (1978) where an employee was protected when she
expressed unwillingness to her employer to testify in accordance with her employer's
wishes in an NLRB hearing. The employee, however, did not actually testify; Phillips
v. Interior Board of Mine OperationsAppeals, 500 F.2d 772, 779 (C.A.D.C. 1974) cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 938, 95 S. Ct. 1149, 43 L. Ed. 2d 415 (1975), where the employee
notified his foreman of possible dangers in the workplace; this was held to be instituting
a proceeding, entitling the employee to the Act's coverage.
Kansas Gas & Electric, 780 F.2d at 1511.
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Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act is modeled after the
1969 Federal Mine Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. 820(b). 53 In 1977, Congress
amended the 1969 mine workers law expressly to protect employees who
54
file internal complaints.
The Brown and Root court used this 1977 Amendment to justify not
applying Federal Mine Safety Act precedent to Section 210 cases. 55 The
Fifth Court reasoned that because Congress amended the 1969 mine
worker law in 1977 to include internal whistleblowing, if they intended
Section 210 (which was passed in 1978) to protect internal whistleblowing, they would have likewise amended it.
But Brown and Root ignored the legislative history of the 1977 mine
safety law amendments. This legislative history makes it clear that Congress did not intend to weaken or negate the judicial interpretations of
the 1969 mine worker protection provision. Instead, Congress explicitly
reaffirmed these interpretations in order to protect the application of
1969 mine worker case law:
The Committee intends to insure the continuing vitality of the various judicial interpretations of section 110 of the Coal Act which
53 S. Rep. No. 95-848, 2nd Sess., 29 reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7303.
54 The statutory language of the 1969 miner law was more restrictive than section 210 and did
not contain protection for "any other action." Under the 1969 miners act protected activity was
defined as:
a) has notified the Secretary or his authorized representative of any alleged violation or
danger,
b) has filed, instituted, or caused to be filed or instituted any proceeding under this
chapter, or
c) has testified or is about to testify in any proceeding resulting from the administration
or enforcement of the provisions of this chapter. 30 U.S.C. 820(b)(1).
55 Brown and Root held that:
Attempts to analogize section 5851 to portions of the National Labor Relations
Act and the Federal Mine Safety Act are not persuasive. The Secretary relies on a
statement in a Senate Report to the effect that section 5851 is substantially identical to
provisions of the Clean Air Act and Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which, the
Secretary argues, were patterned on provisions of the Mine Safety Act [MSA]. S. Rep.
No. 848, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1978). However, the MSA, which was amended only
one year before the ERA, contains language expressly protecting employees filing internal complaints:
No person shall discharge or in any way discriminate against . . . any miner ...
because such miner . . . has filed or made a complaint under or relating to this
chapter, including a complaint notifying the operator or the operator's agent, ... of
an alleged danger or safety or health violation in a . .. mine. ...
30 U.S.C. section 815(c)(1), amended by Pub. L. 95-164, Title II section 201, Nov. 9,
1977, 91 Stat. 1303.
The ERA has no such express language. By the absence of this language it may be
as convincingly argued that in drafting the ERA Congress intended to deny protection
to the filer of an internal report. Comparisons with the MSA do not seem to be helpful
in this case.
747 F.2d at 1034.
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are consistent with the broad protections of the bill's provisions.
56
[Footnote omitted.]

On the basis of this legislative history, the Tenth Circuit, in Kansas
Gas & Electric, rejected Brown and Root's holding. The Tenth Circuit
analyzed this legislative history and concluded that "Congress was advocating the protection of internal action and changed the statutory lanbecause this intent had
guage not because its intent had changed, but
57
been incorrectly perceived by certain courts."
The Fifth Circuit also ignored the important policy issues raised in
the 1969 Mine Health and Safety Act cases; it failed to recognize that
whistleblowing laws for mines and nuclear power plants stem from a basic respect for the dilemma of a worker who must choose between risking
his or her job in an immediate dispute over a health and safety issue, and
remaining silent and continuing with work believed to be dangerous.
The case law that developed under the 1969 law recognized that contacting management prior to lodging a formal complaint with the government was a logical and important "first step" in ensuring that all safety
58 The basic policy considerations decided by the
concerns are resolved. A
courts under the 1969 mine safety law are equally relevant to nuclear and
environmental whistleblowers. Both the laws were designed to assist in
the efficient and aggressive enforcement of important health and safety
laws.
C. ProtectedActivity and Non-Government Contacts
There is no provision in section 210 of the ERA or any other environmental whistleblower law which requires that an employee actually
contact any branch of government. In fact, the legislative history, NRC
regulations, and statutory language all support the proposition that protection of employees who contact non-government agencies or individuals concerning environmental concerns should be afforded protection.
For example, the Secretary of Labor has found that contacting an
"environmental activist" and the news media constituted protected activity. Although the employee did not directly contact a government
agency, the Department of Labor found that contacting these people
"caused" a proceeding. In Wedderspoon v. Milligan,59 the Department
56 S. Rep. No. 91-181, 95th Cong.,. 1st Sess. 36 reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code of Cong. & Ad.

News, 3436.
57 Kansas Gas & Electric v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505, 1512 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, - U.S.
(1986).
58 Phillips v. Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.

denied 420 U.S. 939 (1974); Munsey v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Baker v. U.S.
Department of Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals, 595 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
59 80-WPCA-1, slip op. of ALI at 10-11 (July 11, 1980)], adopted by SOL (July 28, 1980).
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of Labor Administrative Law Judge wrote:
Complainant's contribution to the institution of these investigations is twofold: (1) to bring the sludge discharge information to
the attention of a friend who was an "environmental activist" and
could be expected to act on the information as, indeed, he did;
(2) to state the information which he had together with his views
and charges against the City to a reporter of the Des Moines Register (the state's premier newspaper) whom he could expect to publish them (as the Register did over the reporter's by-line) and to
bring about a full public airing of the matter. While complainant
did not himself ask either the cognizant federal authorities or
DEQ (Iowa Dept. of Environment Quality) for an investigation,
the causal nexus between what he in fact did and the official action
which resulted is so close as to compel the conclusion that complainant "caused to be... initiated [a] proceeding under this chapter [i.e., the Act]." 6°
Although Wedderspoon arose under the Water Pollution Control
Act, Section 210 of the ERA also specifically protects activity which
would "cause" a "proceeding" or an "enforcement" action. Likewise,
employees can "cause" the NRC or Congress to institute a proceeding or
an investigation into a potential violation of a nuclear safety law through
a wide range of activities-not just actual contact with the NRC. In fact,
an employee may feel more comfortable in raising concerns with a union
official than with a government agent whom they do not know. Moreover, giving information to an environmental organization or a citizen's
group which is intervening in the licensing hearing of a nuclear power
plant, or even to the news media, can be more effective in alerting the
public to a potential health hazard and in compelling the governmental
agency to respond aggressively to the perceived health risk 61 thus "causing a proceeding."
The Fifth Circuit in Brown and Root ignored the nongovernment
side of nuclear regulation. Although it noted that there are more "express regulations" governing nuclear energy than "any other industry in
the nation," the Circuit Court failed to consider those regulations which
concern the activities of non-governmental entities and individuals in the
60 The holding is consistent with judicial interpretations which have found that contacting the

media is protected activity under OSHA. Donovan v. Peter Zimmer America, Inc., 557 F. Supp.
642 (D.S.C. 1982).
61 Report to the Chairman on an Investigation into Allegations of Thomas Applegate Concerning the Conduct of the Office of Inspection and Audit, conducted by Judge Helen F. Hoyt, ASLB

and C. Sebastian, Aloot, OGC, July 12, 1983. See, e.g., Billie Garde and Tom Devine, "This one is
abdicating control, " PhiladelphiaInquirer, May 4, 1986, p. 7-G. Union of Concerned Scientists,
Safety Second: A CriticalEvaluation of the NRC's FirstDecade, Washington, D.C., 1985, pp. 77-82,
155-221.
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regulatory process. 62
Citizen participation provisions under NRC regulations are very liberal: any person who obtains information concerning a potential violation of the Atomic Energy Act, the Energy Reorganization Act, or NRC
regulations may file a petition with the NRC to "institute a proceeding
...
to modify, suspend, or revoke a license, or for such other action as
may be proper."' 63 Public interest organizations and individual citizens
can participate in the NRC licensing process or in the enforcement of
health and safety requirements of nuclear power, either by becoming a
formal party to a licensing proceeding," or by filing a request with the
' 65
NRC referred to as a "2.206 petition."
Such citizen participation has been effective. For example, the
NRC's Special Inquiry Group report on the Three Mile Island accident
stated:
Intervenors have made an important impact on safety in some instances-sometimes as a catalyst in the prehearing stage of proceedings, sometimes by forcing more thorough review of an issue
or improved review procedures on a reluctant agency. More important, the promotion of effective citizen participation is a necessary goal of the regulatory system, appropriately demanded by the
public. 66 [emphasis in original]
Direct citizen activity has resulted in hundreds of significant improve67
ments in nuclear safety.
62 Brown and Root, 747 F.2d at 1035.
63 10 C.F.R. 2.206(a).

64 10 C.F.R. 2.714.
65 10 C.F.R. 2.206.

66 Rogovin Report, V. 1, p. 143-44, cited in Union of Concerned Scientists, Safety Second (D.C.,
1985), p. 78.
67 The Union of Concerned Scientists published a partial list of public contributions in resolving
or alerting the NRC to generic health and safety problems.
contributions:

This list included the following

Improvements in the specificity of the requirements for the evaluation of emergency

core cooling systems.
New guidelines on off-site radioactive exposures to be kept "as low as practicable" or

approximately one percent of original limits.
Re-analysis of steam and high-pressure line routing to reduce dangers of pipe rupture,
outside and containment, damaging safety systems.
Closer examination of guidelines for determining distance and activity of earthquake
faultlines on acceptability of location of reactors.
New regulations to improve the protection of safety equipment against fires.
New regulations to assure that plant safety equipment can function in a harsh accident

environment.
Improvements in NRC guidelines and operating practices of licensees and contractors
in the areas of quality control and quality assurance.
Uncovering weaknesses in plant security requirements.
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By the same token, the lack of active citizen participation has been
cited by members of Congress as causing increased nuclear safety
problems. At one plant, in which literally thousands of errors and
problems were uncovered, Representative Edward Markey, Chairman of
the House Interior and Insular Affairs Subcommittee, which oversees the
NRC, stated:
I cannot help but think that such laxness would not have been
possible if there had been intervenors and licensing boards reviewing the work of the NRC staff and MP&L and that
these errors
' 68
would have likely been detected prior to licensing."
The ability of employees to communicate and assist citizen groups, NRC
intervenors, or people who have filed or may file a 2.206 petition-without having to directly contact the NRC 69 -is

vital for the protection of

public health and safety.
The Brown andRoot decision ignored the regulatory function of citizen participation. This failure has resulted in the strangulation of
sources of information available to citizens who are interested in participating in, or who already participate in, NRC proceedings.
IV.

INTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWING AND ATOMIC
ENERGY REGULATION

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was established
to ensure nuclear safety and industry compliance with federal environmental protection and health and safety laws and regulations. 70 As the
court in Brown and Root noted:
Closer attention to the impact of fuel-pellet densification on the safe operational level of
certain boiling water reactors.
Greater use of closed-cycle cooling towers and ponds to lessen heated discharges into
rivers and lakes.
Increased attention to the problems of fish entrapment and marine life entrainment
caused by design and location of a plant's cooling water intake.
More careful review of effects of release of radioactive materials on marine life, shellfish, and clam beds.
Fundamentally improved approach to environmental assessment because of the Calvert
Cliffs case.
Union of Concerned Scientists, Safety Second: A CriticalEvaluation of the NRC's First Decade, pp.
79-80 (Feb. 1985, Washington, D.C.)
68 Markey, letter to Palladino, March 13, 1984, cited on page 83, Union of Concerned Scientists,
Safety Second; also see Edward Markey, statement before the Energy and Environment Subcommittee, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, July 24, 1984.
69 The NRC has been severely criticized for its handling of nuclear safety concerns. See, e.g.:
Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, D.C., Oct. 1979, p. 20;
Union of Concerned Scientists, op. cit.; Michael Weisskopf, "Nuclear Safety: Is the NRC Complacent?" Washington Post, May 6, 1986, p. A17; Billie Garde, Tom Devine, "This One is Abdicating
Control," PhiladelphiaInquirer,May 4, 1986, p. 7-G.
70 See, ERA, 42 U.S.C. 5851 et seq..
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[T]he ERA sets up the structure by which Congress intended the
safety of nuclear installations to be assured. The subchapter creates the NRC and its various constituent monitoring, research,
and enforcement agencies. ERA, 42 U.S.C. 5841-45, 5847-50.
The officers of these agencies are charged with the investigation of
nuclear facilities. Correspondingly, nuclear corporations and corporate officers are charged with ensuring that safety violations are
71
reported and that regulations are enforced.
The NRC's regulatory scheme relies upon internal whistleblowing
to ensure nuclear safety. The NRC depends upon employees first to raise
quality or safety complaints internally, because the Commission does not
have the staff to even visually check for all potential safety violations.
The NRC encourages employees initially to contact management prior to
contacting the NRC. In an NRC "Notice to Employees," which all nuclear facilities are required to post in "locations sufficient to permit employees to observe a copy on the way to and from their place of work, ' 72
the Commission instructed workers initially to contact management
about their concerns. 73 As the Notice's section "How Do I Report Violations" explains:
If you believe that violations of NRC rules or the terms of the
license have occurred, you should report them immediately to your
supervisor. If you believe that adequate corrective action is not
being taken, you may report this to an NRC inspector or the nearest NRC Regional Office. 74 (emphasis added)
Furthermore, NRC regulation 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Appendix C IV(a),
notes the importance the NRC places on employees' intended identifica75
tion of problems.
The NRC has also circulated notices to all Commission licensees
indicating the importance of corporate protection of internal dissent. An
NRC Information notice states:
71 Brown and Root, 747 F.2d at 1035.
72 10 C.F.R. 50.7(3).
73 NRC Notice No. 50-413 and 414 (June 4, 1985).
74 NRC Form 3. Form 3 is required to be posted under 10 C.F.R. 50.7(3).
75 It states:
Because the NRC wants to encourage and support licensee initiativesfor self-identification and correction of problems, NRC will not generally issue a notice of violation for a
violation that meets all of the following tests:
(1) It was identified by the licensee;

(2) It fits in Severity Level IV or V;
(3) It was reported, if required;
(4) It was or will be corrected, including measures to prevent recurrence, within a
reasonable time; and
(5) It was not a violation that could be reasonably expected to have been prevented
by the licensee's corrective action for a previous location. (emphasis added)
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If problems are openly identified and resolved before an employee
feels compelled to contact the NRC, fewer safety concerns will
become allegations to the NRC and there should be fewer instances of real or perceived discrimination.
[T]here can be no question that public health and safety require
that employees feel free 6to raise safety issues to licensee manage7
ment and to the NRC.

NRC regulations also mandate that utility companies constructing
nuclear power plants hire quality control (QC) inspectors who are required to report deficiencies directly to management. 77 The NRC has
recognized the importance of internal QC inspectors: "[T]he NRC can
only review a small fraction of nuclear power plant construction or operation activities. Because of this, the NRC has adopted a regulatory
scheme based on the existence of an onsite, licensee-maintained, quality
assurance (QA) program." Properly implemented, the onsite QA program is an integral part of NRC's overall regulatory program. Further,
licensee and licensee contractor employees assigned to the onsite QA program become, in a practical sense, "a corps of regulators, independent of
construction management, assisting their employer and the NRC in en' 78
suring compliance with all relevant regulatory requirements.
Corporations which harass and intimidate internal whistleblowers
are subject to heavy sanctions by the NRC, including civil penalties and
the suspension or revocation of their license to operate a nuclear
79
facility.
The NRC regulations governing internal dissent are consistent with
day-to-day industry practice and custom. For example, at the Catawba
nuclear power plant construction site in South Carolina, Duke Power
Company's Employee Benefits Handbook states that employees should
bring their concerns to their "immediate supervisor first." Likewise, at
the Comanche Peak nuclear power plant, the project manager had workers sign a memorandum that they would report any concerns to their
supervisors first. Again, at the Wolf Creek facility, management established a "Quality First" program which counsels employees to contact
the quality assurance section of KG&E rather than going directly to the
76 IE Information Notice No. 84-08, 10 C.F.R. 50.7, "Employee Protection" (February 14,

1984).

77 See, 10 C.F.R. part 50, Appendix B.
78 Brief of the U.S. NRC as Amicus Curiae, Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505
(10th Cir. 1985), March 1985, pp. 7-9.
79 10 C.F.R. 50.7; In the Matter of Duke Power, (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units I & 2), Director's Decision Under 10 C.F.R. 2.206, June 4, 1985; In the Matter of Houston Power & Light,
(South Texas Nuclear Project, Units 1 & 2), 12 NRC 281 (1980).
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NRC.80

In the Atomic Safety & License Board proceedings, there is an
abundance of case law from nuclear licensing hearings that illustrates the
importance of internal nuclear whistleblowing. For instance, in the Catawba operating licensing hearings, Administrative Law Judge Kelley
sharply criticized Duke Power for its poor handling of many of the workers who attempted to disclose safety concerns, either to the utility or to
NRC investigators.81 Judge Kelley stated,
[O]ur concept of harassment is any action taken by another employee or superior intended to modify the behavior of a [QA] inspector so as to impede the proper performance of the assigned
task. Harassment may involve use or threat of physical force or
violence or more subtle action or speech intended to intimidate,
embarass or ridicule. An effective harassment policy has to be ap82
plied on actions and conduct offsite as well as onsite.
NRC judges consider harassment of QA inspectors to be extremely
serious because it obstructs the honest and free flow of information necessary for an NRC licensing board to determine whether the plant is properly constructed. Judge Kelley admonished the utility for ignoring the
internal dissent of its employees:
[D]uke would have been wise to listen to Mr. Ross and the complaints of his crew of welding inspectors as they developed long
prior to the Task Force Reviews. Instead the company chose to
let the problem fester and ultimately to accuse Mr. Ross of being
unsupportive of management and acting inappropriately in ques83
tioning management decisions.
The lead whistleblower in the Catawba nuclear plant proceedings
was a welding inspector supervisor, "Beau" Ross, who raised problems
internally to the utility, then later publicly in the licensing proceedings.
Even though Ross never approached the NRC, the NRC's Office of Inspections found that the harassment and intimidation of Ross warranted
a civil penalty. In a Director's Decision Under 10 C.F.R. section
2.206,84 the NRC directly contradicted the Fifth Circuit's ruling that internal dissent is not "protected activity." The director noted:
In determining whether Duke Power Company violated 10 C.F.R.
80 See, brief of the Government Accountability Project, Amicus Curiae, Kansas Gas & Electric

Co. v. Block, 780 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985) at 7-8.
81 In the Matter of Duke Power Co., (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), Partial Initial

Decision, ASLBP No. 81-463-06 OL (1984).
82

Duke Power, supra at 36.

83

Id. at 159.

84

In the Matter of Duke Power Co., (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units I & 2), DD-85-9 (June 4,

1985).
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50.7 in giving Mr. Ross discriminatory performance ratings, the
key question is whether Mr. Ross' activities were "protected." As
noted above, the low performance ratings were in retaliation for
Mr. Ross' strict adherence to procedures and expressions of safety
concerns to management can constitute protected activities within
85
the meaning of section 50.7.
The Director noted further that, as a matter of policy, failing to
protect internal whistleblowing "does not protect public health and
safety."8' 6 Therefore, "[Tihe Commission's response goes beyond immediate remedial action to the person affected. The Commission must ensure that licensees correct conditions that have resulted in improper
discrimination that could affect other employees and prevent recurrence
of such discrimination. 8 7 The Director held that contact with the NRC
was not "a necessary element of protected activity,"'88 and imposed a
$64,000 penalty for the harassment of and discrimination against Beau
Ross for purely internal dissent.8 9
Finally, if employees did not inform their supervisors of potential
health and safety problems, but instead were required to report all these
problems only to the NRC, there would be a dangerous breakdown in the
quality control system. The NRC would be deluged with complaints and
forced to spend time and resources investigating minor complaints
which, under any reasonable system, would have been successfully handled internally.
Without even considering the NRC regulations or industry custom
and practice, the Brown and Root court held that the "costs" of protecting internal whistleblowers would "exceed the benefits." 90 The use of a
cost/benefit analysis, without reference to any factual record, was absurd; its conclusions were wrong. Not only does the Brown and Root
decision frustrate the NRC's ability to monitor nuclear power and thus
undermines safety, it actually increases the costs of construction and regulation, a problem which the NRC itself has recognized. In an Amicus
Curiae brief filed by the NRC in Kansas Gas & Electric, the Solicitor of
the NRC noted that the "NRC has encouraged its employees to inform
licensee management initially of their safety concerns so that their concern can be resolved without the need for extensive NRC involvement.
NRC involvement carries the potential for licensing delays that can cost
millions of dollars to utilities, their shareholders, and their customers per
85 Id. at

6.
at 8.
87 Id. at 12.
88 Id. at 12.
89 Id. at 21.
90 747 F.2d at 1035.
86 Id.
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month." 9 1

The Fifth Circuit blindly and erroneously guessed at what rule of
protected activity would lead to a cost-effective approach. This is especially reprehensible since the costs of nuclear safety hazards, not only in
financial terms, but in terms of human lives and wasted resources, are
92
immense-perhaps incalculable.
V.

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND INTERNAL DISCLOSURES

Purely internal complaints, or mixed internal-external complaints
raised by employees have significantly enhanced environmental safety at
nuclear construction sites. Such complaints have resulted in utilities being ordered to perform major corrective actions; in the NRC's fining utilities that violate safety regulations; and in the cancellation of nuclear
power plants under construction, where systemic quality control and
health and safety violations were discovered.
In the case of a nuclear plant in Ohio, both internal and external
whistleblowing led to the discovery of massive quality control and quality assurance breakdowns, and hardware deficiencies. The disclosures,
which were the result of information provided to the NRC by a utility
employee, resulted in a $200,000 fine in 1981 against the Cincinnati Gas
& Electric Company (CG&E), the utility constructing the plant. 93 Fifty
thousand dollars of that fine was assessed for illegal utility harassment
94
and intimidation of its quality control inspectors.
The Zimmer disclosures illustrate the importance of the policy behind protecting those employees who bring to light what they perceive as
significant safety problems. The case arose because of the work of Tom
Applegate, a detective hired by the utility to uncover time-card cheating.
Applegate instead discovered a string of serious violations of atomic energy law, which he attempted to report to utility management. The management's response was to fire Applegate, warning him not to pursue his
allegations with the NRC. One of the utility's vice presidents, in a faceto-face confrontation with Applegate, warned Applegate not to take his
evidence to the NRC. The vice president suggested Zimmer's massive
cooling tower symbolized the utility's might, and compared Applegate to
a mouse. Applegate's retorted, "You've never heard of the mouse that
roared?" Because Applegate persisted in going to the NRC, Congress,
91 Brief of the U.S. NRC as Amicus Curiae, Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505

(10th Cir. 1985), CA 84-2114 filed March 1985, pp. 6-8.
92 Forbes Magazine, February 11, 1985, "Nuclear Follies".
'13Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-8233, 16 NRC 1489 (1982).
94 Id. at 1494.
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the media and public interest groups, the safety violations were eventually investigated, and found to represent just the tip of the iceberg of
95
safety problems.
The success of Applegate at Zimmer in bringing the information to
light, and in getting his concerns addressed, paved the way for other
workers to reveal flaws which they had previously been reluctant to expose. 96 But unfortunately that didn't stop the harassment of inspectors.
In one 1982 incident, a bucket of cold water containing human waste was
dumped on quality control inspectors, 9 7 the resultant uproar leading to a
construction shutdown. 9 8 In the ensuing two year period, dozens of
workers stepped forward with information demonstrating a "widespread
breakdown in quality control" at the Zimmer plant. 99 Eventually, it became evident that the violations were so severe that the NRC issued a
show-cause order in 1984 to the utility requiring it to explain why the
Commission shouldn't withdraw the company's construction permit for
the plant. The plant, although 98% complete, was cancelled by the utility soon thereafter.
Another case where internal/external dissent led to fines and congressional hearings was that of the Three Mile Island (TMI) plant. Richard Parks was a safety engineer with Bechtel Corporation, a
subcontractor at General Public Utilities (GPU), owner of the Three
Mile Island nuclear plant. Parks' job was to review engineering specifications during the clean-up stage of the damaged Unit Two reactor. In
1983, Parks vigorously opposed the utility's plan to lift the 170-ton radioactive reactor vessel head of the Unit Two reactor with a polar crane
whose brakes had been destroyed in the TMI accident, whose electrical
systems had been severely damaged and which itself had not been loadtested since the repairs. His internal dissent to management was to no
avail.
Mr. Parks was forced to go outside the organization, to the news
media, to public interest groups and to Congress. Only then was his dissent effective. Within a few days, his public eloquence forced GPU to
postpone the reactor vessel head lift. Congressional hearings soon fol95 See Cincinnati Post, November 15, 1984 at 1, col. 2 (evening ed.).
96 Nuclear Oversight Hearing on Quality Assurance at Zimmer Nuclear Station before the Subcomm. on Energy and Environment, Comm. on the Interior and InsularAffairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
(June 10, 1982) (statement of Thomas M. Devine on behalf of the Government Accountability
Project).
97 See, Cincinnati Enquirer,June 3, 1982 at 1, col. 1.
98 Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-8233, 16 NRC 1489 (1982).
99 Id. at 1489.
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lowed.'0° Mr. Parks had opened a Pandora's Box of illegality: a new
NRC team later confirmed not only that the clean-up operation was systematically illegal, but that NRC site officials had colluded with utility
management to bypass the Commission's safety regulations. 10 The
NRC required GPU to rewrite the entire clean-up program, and to perform full tests on the disputed polar crane. 102
There is also no question that Mr. Parks' public service initiatives
cost him his career at Bechtel. The retaliation in response to Parks' private and public dissent is a matter of public record. The Department of
Labor10 3 and the NRC both concluded there had been illegal reprisals. 104
Mr. Parks' initiatives also have earned praise from industry groups. On
May 13, 1986, he was awarded the "Award for Outstanding Service to
the Public Interest" from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. Society on Social Implications of Technology. 105
The NRC regulations accurately reflect industry custom and practice. A rule concerning protected activity which frustrates logical dayto-day procedures serves no valid function, undermines the legal protections afforded whistleblowers, and causes regulatory anarchy. As the
NRC itself has declared: "A narrow reading of Section 210 to exclude
internal filings ... would undermine the NRC's regulatory framework
and frustrate the broad remedial purposes of Congress in adopting Sec''
tion 210. 106
100 Hearings Before the Energy and Environment Subcommittee of the House Interior and Insular
Affairs Committee, April 26, 1983.
101 See, In the Matter of GeneralPublic Utilities Nuclear Corp., (Three Mile Island, Unit 2), EA
84-137, "Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty", March 4, 1986. Also, see, The [Harrisburg] Evening News, May 17, 1983 at C-I, col. 1.
102 See McGowan, The Whistleblowing Game: Truth and Consequences, New Age Journal, Sep-

tember, 1984 at 37.
103 DOL Case No. 83-ERA-8.
104 In the matter of GPU Nuclear Corp., supra.
105 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. Society on Social Implications of Technology, Press Release, (May 13, 1986), "Richard D. Parks Receives SSIT Award for Outstanding
Public Service in the Public Interest". The Press Release stated:
Richard Parks, with colleagues, challenged certain procedures instituted by his
employer as unsafe and in violation of regulations. His allegations were upheld upon
investigation by the cognizant offices of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
In raising these issues, Richard Parks followed his best engineering judgment and acted
from his sense of engineering responsibility, knowing that he risked his chosen career.
His courageous adherence to the highest standards of professional ethics deserves the
respect and admiration of the engineering profession.
106Brief of the U.S. NRC as Amicus Curiae, Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505
(10th Cir. 1985), CA 84-2114 filed March 1985, p. 10. Although Brown and Root was oblivious to
the NRC's regulatory scheme, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits both
carefully considered the needs of the NRC in holding that internal whistleblowers are protected
under section 210 of the ERA. Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Systems, 735 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th
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"BROWN AND ROOT" AND PUBLIC SAFETY

In order to effectuate Congress' intent, the protected activity provisions of section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act must be interpreted broadly. Only this interpretation will protect good faith
disclosure of potential quality and health and safety concerns that are
reported directly to an employee's supervisors and to other persons who
may reasonably assist in causing a proceeding or enforcement action
under the ERA or the Atomic Energy Act. A narrow interpretation will
frustrate the regulation of the industry: it will stifle the ability of citizen
intervenors to initiate or to participate in NRC proceedings; it will cripple the NRC's quality assurance program; and will result in grave uncorrected problems which will inevitably harm public health and safety.
The failure to protect internal or nongovernmental disclosures will
also create an atmosphere of fear. Employees will not be "free to raise
safety issues."' 0 7 The effectiveness of section 210 will be undermined, for
as the Supreme Court recognized in Scrivener, the viability of
whistleblower protection laws depends upon prohibiting employer conduct which causes the "intimidation of prospective complainants."' 0 8
The Brown and Root decision stands to incite regulatory chaos. Employees will not know with whom they can and cannot discuss health and
safety issues. It is simply naive to assume that an employee would differentiate among various offices or understand the specific meaning of
"competent organ of government." Can a worker speak to his or her
union? What about state authorities? What about citizen groups legally
intervening in NRC proceedings? What about Congress? What about
the line supervisor? Such confusion guarantees the successful oppression
of vital information. In such an atmosphere of intimidation-where employees can be fired for talking about safety problems with coworkers or
supervisors--communication lines will be permanently chilled.'0 9
Cir. 1984); Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505, 1512-13 (10th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 107

U.S. -

(1986).

NRC I.E. Information Notice No. 84-08.

108 405 U.S. at 122.
109 This is not just hyperbole. In Atchison v. Tompkins Beckwick, 82-ERA-12, recommended
decision of ALJ, 2/22/85, a DOL ALJ interpreted Brown and Root as meaning that an employee
who complains to management and then goes to the NRC can be legally terminated for the offense of
complaining to management. In Atchison, the ALJ found that corporate management became aware
of the employees' internal and external complaints simultaneously. The judge reasoned that, under
the dual motive standard announced in Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), the employee's
termination could be justified on the basis of his internal whistleblowing. The ALJ reasoned:
(Employer's) stated reason for dicharging (employee) directly relates to his internal
whistleblowing activities and there is no reason founded in logic that would suggest
that an employer would feel any less threatened and, correspondingly, any less motivated to retaliate against an internal whistleblower than it would an external
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The holding in Brown and Root, if followed, would emasculate the
whistleblower protection laws. The only realistic method of stopping the
intimidation of prospective witnesses is to prohibit their harassment or
discharge for raising issues of public health and safety.
Congress has recognized the importance of protecting internal dissent in whistleblower protection legislation because the worker is in the
best position to observe violations of law. The Fifth Circuit's narrow
view in Brown and Root's statutory construction is repugnant to this
well-established policy, as well as to other Circuits' caselaw. From
Scrievener, which held that broad interpretation of such statutes is necessary to the effective enforcement of mine safety, to Phillips,which explicitly extended this reasoning to the protection of internal complaints, the
courts have overwhelmingly agreed that contacting management internally is a logical first step of a worker who uncovers a possible violation.
Finally, the NRC itself has recognized that extending the protections of
the nuclear whistleblower protection statute to internal dissent is desirable because it is consistent with the regulatory scheme. The NRC explicitly directs workers who have discovered possible violations to contact
their management first. From agency enforcement actions to administrative case law, the NRC has consistently protected the internal dissenter.
There is no question that if the Brown and Root reasoning prevails,
the nuclear worker's freedom to raise safety complaints will be chilled;
there would then be significantly less safety in an industry that, as
Chernobyl proves once and for all, requires more safety.
whistleblower. Thus, if internal whistleblowing is considered unprotected conduct,
then the proof in the record shows that (employer) would have discharged (employee)
for his unprotected conduct even if the protected conduct had not occurred. citing Mt.
Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
Thus, under Brown and Root, if an employee complains internally and also contacts the NRC,
the employer can defend against a subsequent section 210 action on the basis that the employee was
fired for raising concerns to management. Such a defense, which apparently exists under Brown and
Root, would render section 210 meaningless.

